

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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1. Within the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union there is a Foreign Directorate, which is responsible for the control of foreign Communist parties. Aleksandr Semenovitch Panyushkin headed this directorate. [redacted] The covert policy direction of foreign Communist parties by the Central Committee was turned over to the Foreign Directorate at the time of the liquidation of the Comintern in 1943. [redacted] there may have been a foreign section of the Central Committee prior to such dissolution; and, when the Foreign Directorate took over the Comintern's functions, such a foreign section would have been raised to a directorate level.
2. The Comintern's revolutionary (ie, subversive) activities were soft-pedalled as a sop [redacted] during World War II. After the war, as the international situation deteriorated, they were stepped up again, but under the aegis of the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
3. Whereas the covert control functions of the Comintern devolved on the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee, the other paramilitary functions fell to the organs of the MGB/MVD and, possibly, the GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate) of the Soviet General Staff.
4. [redacted] the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee does not have any permanent representatives abroad. In special cases a representative may be sent on a flying visit; but, normally, liaison with foreign Communist parties is effected through the residency of the foreign intelligence directorate of the MVD. Traditionally, the GRU of the Soviet General Staff served as the liaison and communications link with foreign Communist parties, even before World War II and the dissolution of the Comintern. [redacted]

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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many officers of the foreign intelligence directorate of the former MGB felt that this directorate was a more appropriate instrument for dealing with foreign Communist parties than the GRU. In 1951, by a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the responsibility for liaison with the foreign Communist parties was taken away from the GRU and turned over to the foreign intelligence directorate of the then MGB. This decision was communicated to Soviet missions throughout the world in the form of a directive. In at least one Soviet mission abroad, the GRU rezident attempted to continue his activities with the local Communist party after receipt of this directive, but was summarily ordered by Moscow to sever all connections with the local party at once and for all.

5. As some contact-men between one local Communist party and the Soviet mission had precise advance instructions on the mechanics of establishing contact prior to the turnover from GRU to MGB control, [] this indicated the existence of separate clandestine channels of communication between the local Communist party and the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, [] no additional information on the possible existence of such channels. 25X1
6. Correspondence with Moscow on Communist Party matters is given special security handling. The foreign intelligence directorate rezident abroad personally enciphers and deciphers the more important cable traffic dealing with the local Communist party. Even within the foreign intelligence directorate rezidentura there is an effort to conceal the existence of any liaison with the local Communist party. With the exception of certain highly trusted ambassadors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel are kept ignorant of the existence of liaison with local Communist parties. They are, furthermore, strictly forbidden to have any covert dealings with local Communists.
7. [] the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee rarely sends special representatives to foreign Communist parties. When it does, however, the representative is likely to be an MVD man, because he can be expected to have greater familiarity with the tradecraft of covert contact than a member of the Central Committee. If a Central Committee man should be sent, he would rely on the local foreign intelligence directorate rezidentura to make secure contact arrangements for him. 25X1
8. [] intelligence apparatus exist within foreign Communist parties [] only the most trusted Communist Party members are used for intelligence work; ordinary Party members are exploited on an unwitting basis. [] it is possible that local name-checks are sometimes made through Communist Party facilities. When this is done, every effort is made to conceal the interest of the foreign intelligence directorate. However, every effort is made to avoid involvement of local Communist parties in Soviet intelligence activities. "Legal" representatives of the foreign intelligence directorate abroad are categorically forbidden to recruit Communist Party members without special permission from Moscow. Although their recruitment is not formally forbidden, it is at least seriously discouraged and there must be strong operational justification for their recruitment. [] the MVD could give permission to effect the recruitment of a foreign Communist if he were not well-known or important and just inform the Foreign Directorate of the CPSU. On the other hand, if the foreign Communist were at all important, his recruitment would have to be cleared by the Foreign Directorate. 25X1
9. The Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee of the CPSU does not have any intelligence functions in the normal sense of the term. It does not run agents. On the other hand, both overt and covert elements of foreign Communist parties collect information in the course of their activities; this information is passed on to the Foreign Directorate through MVD liaison channels. [] 25X1

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[] intelligence derived from the operations of the intelligence services is given only to the Foreign Directorate if it concerns the activities of foreign Communist parties; there is no reason for giving military or scientific reports to the Foreign Directorate. However, the question of whether or not the Foreign Directorate receives intelligence reports from the MVD is, to a certain extent, academic, since the Central Committee of the CPSU is the primary customer for all important intelligence reports in any case.

10. Subsidies given to foreign Communist parties are [] for general financial support. The local MVD rezidentura turns over the money to the local Communist Party liaison representative, who executes a receipt for it; the local Party then decides how the money will be allocated.

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[] the Chinese Communist Party once requested \$50,000 for certain purposes in 1947 or 1948. When the request reached Moscow, Stalin personally directed that \$300,000 be given to the Chinese Communist Party rather than the \$50,000 for which it had asked. This money was paid through the MVD rezidentura in China.

11. The Soviet press and radio give the general policy line to be followed by the foreign Communist parties; specific tactical direction is given through the MVD liaison channel. In addition, foreign Communist party members are briefed when they visit Moscow. [] no information on Comintern training schools or current facilities for training foreign Communists in the USSR. The fact that the recommendations of the Central Committee of the CPSU are a weighty factor in the selection of foreign Communist party leaders acts as another control.

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12. International front organizations are envisaged primarily as a means of educating the non-Party masses abroad. These organizations are not exploited as organizations by Soviet intelligence organs, although individual members are recruited. However, [] such individuals are rarely recruited. This is because, by and large, in virtue of their identification with the "democratic" movements, they usually do not have access to worthwhile targets. The MVD does not mix into foreign political matters; its job is to inform the Soviet Government, not to execute policy.

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1. [] Comment: Under the old NKGB, the First Directorate was responsible for foreign intelligence. In 1946, when the NKGB became the MGB, the First Directorate became the First Chief Directorate. Since the merger of the MVD and MGB in 1953, the foreign intelligence directorate has been the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD.

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